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I. INTRODUCTION
Fig. 1. Diagram showing how LTE performs a page
In this project I explore using a software defined radio
to execute a paging attack on an LTE network. Paging is
the process of a mobile network locating a device within a
tracking area with broadcast messages or pages. Since these
are broadcasted, all devices can see and decode these messages
[1] [2]. The pages contain a devices globally unique temporary
identifier (GUTI), which is used to locate a device within the
tracking area.
Due to the lack of security around the GUTI, I show
that an adversary with expertise and a software defined radio
can capture these identifiers [1]. When these identifiers are
captured, it is possible to identify an individual within a
tracking area since the GUTI is unique. This is known as an
LTE paging attack. The attack utilizes the GUTI value stored
in an LTE page. An adversary would capture LTE pages over
the air and link the GUTI values stored in the pages with a
device that is in the same tracking area.
Tracking is another attack that can be executed using the
GUTI values. Since GUTI values are not reassigned when
the device changes mobile management entities (MME), an
adversary can very easily track a moving individual [1]. This
attack leverages the design that LTE only pages for a device
within a tracking area. The MME knows that the device is in
its tracking area and to locate the device it sends out a page
[3] his design reveals that it is possible to execute a tracking
attack if the device changes MMEs.
A practical implementation of this experiment has been
performed before but only on the GSM network. Since LTE
is generational iteration of the GSM network some of the
techniques used in the GSM network still exist in LTE, and
One of these techniques is paging. The GSM network also
used a paging technique in order to locate devices but instead
of using the GUTI identifier it would use the Temporary
Mobile Subscriber Identity (TMSI) and in some case the
International Mobile subscriber Identity (IMSI) [4]. I took
the same implementation of the GSM experiment and applied
it to the LTE network using a software defined radio.
This experiment allowed me to utilize a software defined
radio (SDR). SDR devices are a new area of radio hardware
technology where all the components of a hardware radio is
implemented in software [5]. This makes this devices very
versatile because it can be reprogrammed to perform any radio
required tasks. In this case I had flashed a program on the SDR
to use it as an LTE radio device.
The new SDR technology and software like srsLTE are
important contributions that allowed for this practical attack.
srsLTE turns the SDR into an LTE radio and has all the
components to decode the paging messages. The evidence of
previous practical implementations of this attack on the GSM
network also contributed to the feasibility of performing this
attack on LTE.
The following contributions where made as a result of the
implementation:
• Implement a practical paging attack in LTE
• Utilize a software define radio to capture pages
• Tested 3 sources of LTE pages (phone calls, SMS mes-
sages, and WhatsApp)
I show that with the correct hardware and software a very
simple identification and location attack can be performed
using LTE pages. I also reveal that this attack is not lim-
ited to only phone calls and SMS messages, but messenger
applications like WhatsApp can also be used in these attacks.
II. RELATED WORK
Related work within this subject has been limited to the
GSM network. Since the LTE baseband implementation has
just recently been released there has still been little research
within this area. Although there has been limited LTE paging
research the problems of mobile paging still exist going all the
way back to the first generation of mobile communications.
Similar work to this project only centered around the GSM
network on 2G [4]. The existing work focuses on the GPRS
protocol that can also be known as 2.5G. When the GPRS
protocol was implemented it also used a paging technique to
locate devices within a tracking area, but instead of using
temporary identifiers (TMSI), the GPRS protocol used the
devices IMSI. The IMSI is unique to every device so it does
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and re-identification and tracking attacks can be executed on
mobile subscribers.
Other forms of work in this area include the collection
of GUTI identifiers in the LTE network. In the article, At-
tacks Against Privacy and Availability in 4G/LTE Mobile
Communication Systems, the authors show how the GUTI
value can be a valuable source of information. The GUTI
contains both a mobile subscriber’s temporary identifier (m-
TMSI) and the MME identifier that they are connected to.
Given this information, an adversary has the ability to track
an individual [1].
The majority of the work that has been done involves
creating a rogue base station using an SDR. In this scenario, an
adversary would create a fake cell tower that would operate
on a common mobile frequency in its area. This is known
as an IMSI catch or a rogue base station. This base station
would act like a cell tower but provide no service, instead,
it would collect IMSI’s of devices nearby. With these IMSI’s
an adversary can carry out the same tracking attacks in the
previous examples, but additionally, create a denial of service
attack by sending a disconnect message to the device. In this
scenario, the device will be in a disconnected state and will
not be able to reconnect back into service until a restart is
performed.
Some studies have shown that an adversary can implement
a rogue base station and using the captured TMSIs or IMSI,
impersonate the mobile subscriber [6]. The rogue base station
would use the captured TMSIs and send messages out to sub-
scribers using the TMSIs, impersonating the the subscriber’s
TMSI. Other work like the one implemented by Aragon et.al
[7] show how a rogue GSM base station is able to eavesdrop
on a GSM network.
III. TOOLS AND SOFTWARE
The project was to simulate a paging attack on LTE. The
idea of the project is similar to ones that have been replicated
on the GSM networks [4]. I wanted to be able to show
that even though LTE uses temporary identifiers that it is
still susceptible to identification attacks. Since most mobile
networks do not rotate the GUTI values that are assigned to
LTE devices [1], a tracking attack is also possible.
In this experiment, an Ettus B200 mini SDR [8] with a
900Mhz Omni-directional antenna was used with srsLTE [9].
srsLTE is an open source baseband LTE implementation. This
means that it is able to mimic an LTE device and allows
for users to sniff LTE pages and setup rogue base to test
LTE networks. In this case, srsLTE was used for its Physical
Downlink Shared Channel (PDSCH) sniffing capabilities.
The Physical Downlink Shared Channel is the channel that
LTE uses to transmit pages. When the MME makes a paging
request it is sent to all the LTE towers in its tracking area.
The towers then broadcasts the page on the PDSCH.
srsLTE was modified so that it would capture and decode
the pages, this makes it easier to search for a specific GUTI,
in this case, the test device. Another modification that was
made to srsLTE was combining it with and ASN1 library so
that when the pages were captured they could be decoded to a
human readable format. The ASN1 library that was used was
ASN1C [10].
The test device is a rooted Nexus 5X. The device was
rooted so that applications could be installed in the device
to make sniffing identification easier. LTE Discovery [11] and
TMSI catcher detector called AIMSICD [12]. With these two
applications installed I was able to determine the devices
EARFCN which is the radio-frequency channel number the
device is connected to.
Fig. 2. Ettus B200 Mini and Nexus 5X
The test was performed in an open environment so that it
was possible to see other GUTI identifiers. This allowed me
to confirm that srsLTE and the SDR were in fact operating
correctly and receiving LTE pages. Since srsLTE is required
to listen to a specific cellular tower at a given frequency,
performing this experiment in a Faraday cage would not be
possible.
IV. DESIGN
Due to the lack of page decoding in srsLTE, I combined
it with an ASN.1 library in order to interpret the pages
that srsLTE was capturing. In order to achieve this srsLTE
was combined with asn1c, C implementation of the ASN.1
description language. Once these two libraries are combined
the pages will now be displayed in a human readable format.
This is pictured in Figure 3.
The first step was to determine what frequency the device
was transmitting on. srsLTE has binaries for searching for
a specific device on a specific LTE band. Figure 4 shows
how srsLTE searches for devices on a given band. Once the
frequency has been identified, srsLTE is then set to listen on
the Physical Downlink Shared Channel (PDSCH) channel for
paging messages.
In order to match the frequency of the scanned device to
our Nexus 5X, I used the LTE Discovery app to match the cell
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Fig. 4. Results of srsLTE searching for devices
ids. All LTE devices are given a cell id [13]. The cell search
binary in srsLTE will show a devices cell id and the frequency
it is transmitting on if it is found and using LTE Discovery I
was able to determine the LTE frequency the Nexus 5X was
on.
One of the difficult tasks of performing a paging attack in
an experimental environment similar to the one that I have
created is determining the GUTI value of the test device. The
M-TMSI, the device identification that is part of the GUTI is
stored in the SIM card [14]. But due to the different types
of sim cards and the lack of documentation if the memory
structure of them, it is almost impossible to retrieve these
values without specialized hardware.
Due to the lack of information on how to extract the GUTI
from a device, I performed multiple sniffing sessions. During
the sniffing sessions, I would call test device on each sniffing
session. Once multiple sniffing sessions were complete, they
are compared to determine which GUTI value has appeared
across all sessions. Once a list of GUTI identifiers has been
determined, another sniffing session is performed, but this time
I grep for each of the GUTI values while placing calls to the
test device. If the GUTI belongs to the test device, then the
GUTI identifier would appear in srsLTEs output.
This method of determining the GUTI of a device is
potentially inaccurate, but since there is no known way of
extracting this value from the device, this is the only way I
was able to get a close approximation. At this point, if the
correct GUTI value was found then srsLTE will display the
GUTI value while it is sniffing for pages.
Other forms of communication that can trigger a page
include WhatsApp and SMS messages. After identifying a
possible GUTI for the test device, the same experiment was
performed using WhatsApp and SMS messages. With SMS
messages the results were very similar to the phone call. Once
the device received the SMS message, the GUTI would appear
in srsLTE.
WhatsApp has a very particular feature and that is during
a conversation an individual is able to see when the sender is
typing. This typing notification is also known for triggering
pages [1]. In this experiment I was able to show that the
typing indication does in fact trigger a page without having to
send a message. Once WhatsApp sends the message, a page
is sent to the receiver.
All experiments run using the phone call, SMS Message,
and WhatsApp was under the assumption that the attacker
knows the mobile subscriber. This assumption needs to made
since in order for this attack to be executed, the attacker would
need to know the phone number of the subscriber in order to
trigger the page.
V. RESULTS
In this section I will describe the results of the experiments
that were performed on the test device. The 3 forms of
communication that were tested was a call, SMS messages,
and WhatsApp. One anomaly that was discovered for each of
the tests was a noticeable delay between the communication
and GUTI from srsLTE. The delay could be caused by srsLTE
buffering the pages that it receives but that is outside of the
scope of this experiment.
A. Phone Calls
The phone call was the first test that was performed. Since
a phone call is known sending pages in previous generations
of mobile communications, it was used to confirm whether a
GUTI was associated with the test device. The results of this
experiment did show that a phone call does trigger an LTE
page when a call is placed to the test device. Once srsLTE had
started listening for pages, multiple phone calls were made
to the test device. The test devices GUTI would appear in
srsLTE after said delay. All phone calls to the test device were
accounted for.
B. SMS Message
The results from the SMS message was similar to the phone
call. Similar to previous generations of mobile communica-
tions, the SMS messages are also expected to trigger a page
when a device is receiving an SMS message. The same results
also appeared in this test. srsLTE is able to capture the GUTI
of the test device when an SMS Message is sent to it.
4C. WhatsApp
WhatsApp is a mobile messenger that uses the internet in
order to send and receive messages. A unique feature of these
types of messengers is the ability to show when a user is typing
a message. Some related research has proposed that the typing
notification will also trigger an LTE page along with the sent
message. The results defend the claim that the typing indicator
also triggers a page. srsLTE indicates that it has captured the
test device’s GUTI when only typing a WhatsApp message
without pressing send.
Fig. 5. srsLTE results from a phone call
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The results show that with proper hardware, an attacker can
execute a simple identification attack. With a few more data
points that the same attacker can track a user. Overall this leak
in data can have large implications if it is not resolved by the
mobile industry.
A. Cost
The cost of the demonstrated attack is calculated to be
around $1000, but due to the versatility of software defined
radios the cost can be much less. There have been articles that
show individuals that convert television and radio receivers
into SDRs. In this article by Vierinen shows how an SDR can
be built using a Realtek RTL dongle of less then $25 [15].
With the cost of SDR hardware being so cheap, attacks like
LTE paging attacks become more viable.
B. Risks
The risks of this attack is very minimal. The mobile
subscriber is never aware that their GUTI is being collected
and as a result the adversary has protected. The pages are also
broadcasted so there is no easy way to identify individuals
that are sniffing for it. The only possible way to identify the
adversary was if they were seen with the SDR, but even then
it will be difficult to prove that they were collecting/sniffing
for GUTIs.
C. Future work
The next step to take in this project would be to determine
when and how to get the GUTI value to change. Since these
values are temporary, they should be able to change. Since the
GUTI values do not change when the device switches MME,
it would be interesting to find out when they do.
Another area to explore would be to determine how big
of a radius an individual can be tracked using the GUTI and
the SDR. Since this may be implementation specific, it would
still be interesting to see how far a person can be tracked. The
tracking capability will be dependent on what frequency the
LTE signal is transmitted on, since some LTE frequencies are
capable of traveling farther compared to other frequencies.
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